

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
SENATE HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF
MAJOR GENERAL ARNOLD L. PUNARO, USMCR (Ret.), CHAIRMAN
LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES E. SHERRARD, AFR (Ret.), COMMISSIONER, AND
MAJOR GENERAL E. GORDON STUMP, ANG (Ret.), COMMISSIONER
COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES
ON THE
FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS:
Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force
BEFORE THE
SENATE HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
FEBRUARY 13, 2008

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
SENATE HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

**TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL ARNOLD L. PUNARO, USMCR (Ret.), CHAIRMAN
LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES E. SHERRARD, AFR (Ret.), COMMISSIONER, AND
MAJOR GENERAL E. GORDON STUMP, ANG (Ret.), COMMISSIONER
COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES
BEFORE THE SENATE
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
FEBRUARY 13, 2008**

It is a pleasure to appear before the Committee this morning to discuss the final report of the independent Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, titled *Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force*. I ask that our full statement, as well as the executive summary of our final report, be entered in its entirety into the record.

I am accompanied this morning by two fellow Commissioners, James Sherrard and Gordon Stump. Each has had an extraordinarily distinguished career and possesses unique expertise in the subject matter addressed both by the Commission and the Committee this morning. On behalf of our nine other fellow Commissioners, whom we are representing, we want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member Senator Collins, for the support you have given to the Commission and for the strong bipartisan leadership this Committee has shown over the years in improving the nation's capabilities to protect and defend the nation and to manage and recover in crisis situations. This Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee, along with the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, have always enjoyed a strong crossover membership, a feature that has resulted in significant enhancements to our security.

As established by section 513 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, the Commission was chartered to identify and recommend changes in law and policy to ensure that the National Guard and Reserves are organized, trained, equipped, compensated, and supported to best meet the national security requirements of our nation now, and in the future. Congress subsequently tasked us to study the "advisability and feasibility of implementing" the provisions of the proposed National Defense Enhancement and National Guard Empowerment Act. That report – with 23 recommendations – was submitted on March 1 of last year. Defense Secretary Gates acted on it quickly and decisively. He conducted a thorough review and accepted, in large measure, 20 of its 23 recommendations on reforms to the National Guard and Reserves. Implementation of those recommendations is well under way within the Department. Likewise, Congress acted quickly and decisively by incorporating most of the Commission's recommendations requiring statutory action in the

recently enacted National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. In doing so, Congress and DOD have sent a powerful message that DOD's roles and responsibilities in the homeland have changed in several fundamental ways. In the Commission's opinion, this represents the kind of sweeping change that is essential given the threats our nation faces at home and overseas.

I would also like to take this opportunity to say a few words about the Government Accountability Office. As its committee of jurisdiction, you should know what a great help this agency has been to the Commission. Its work has been thorough, objective, and professional. I know that all 12 commissioners extend their thanks to GAO and its fine leader, David Walker, for the tremendous job they have done in helping us fulfill our responsibilities. The GAO, in fact, has written dozens and dozens of reports in the homeland area in addition to the work they did for us.

The 95 recommendations in our final report both address the Commission's initial charter and also engage more deeply with issues addressed in the March 1 report: specifically, our concerns with respect to the sustainability of an operational reserve, codification of the Department of Defense's role in the homeland, and the planning and resourcing processes to address threats in the homeland.

With regard to these and other areas addressed in our final report, we have tried to identify the problems that need to be fixed and have suggested solutions. Many of these issues are extremely complex, and people of good character and conscience will disagree with some of the solutions we propose. We believe Congress's mandate to us was to report what we found, and we did that. We also recognize that further analysis by the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, and Congress may lead to alternative remedies. We encourage these improvements or alternatives to our recommendations. The Commission's focus is on fixing the problems. Fewer than half of our 95 recommendations require legislation. These are areas where DOD can undertake a change in policies and regulations right away, and Congress can enact some immediate statutory changes as well, particularly on our recommendations on the homeland. Other recommendations, primarily in the area of personnel management, will take careful thought and analysis by DOD and Congress to determine how best they should be implemented in order to achieve the desired outcomes. Some are likely to require phased implementation over a lengthy period of time.

I cannot emphasize too strongly that our recommendations are in no way a critique of officials currently serving in Congress or the Pentagon or of their predecessors in previous administrations. Many of these problems have persisted for decades and have often seemed intractable. Others are tied to new and emerging threats. It is understandable, given the operational commitments that have by necessity been its first priority, that the Department of Defense has not been able to fully develop strategies regarding the National Guard and Reserves.

The Department has made real progress on many issues since 9/11. For example, it has addressed the more immediate challenges associated with recruitment and retention in an increasingly difficult environment. It has ensured that mobilized Guard and Reserve units are fully trained and equipped prior to deployment. It has also made a down payment on addressing the complex personnel management issues it expects to confront in the 21st century. Funding for the reserve components is trending upward, and additional funding is in the pipeline to remedy the equipment shortages, particularly in the Army National Guard.

The Commission's work is not a report card. The Commission's enabling statute did not direct us to examine how far we've come; rather, our mandate was to concentrate on how far we need to go to get to the desired end state. It will be up to Congress, DHS, and DOD to make the ultimate determinations about that end state, and about how much of the gap between where we are now and where the Commission suggests we need to go you are committed to addressing.

As we prepared the report, we attempted to be both thorough and all-encompassing in the collection and analysis of data. We held 17 days of public hearings with 115 witnesses; had 52 Commission meetings; conducted more than 850 interviews with public officials and other subject matter experts, including current and former Secretaries of Defense and Chairmen and Vice Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and examined thousands of documents. We did not just gather "official wisdom" in Washington; we made a concerted effort to get outside the Beltway for field hearings, site visits, and focus groups and talked to service members, families, employers, and many others. I want to add, Mr. Chairman, that the 12 members of the Commission brought 288 total years of military service, 186 total years of non-military government service, and many years of private-sector experience to this task. We have

Commissioners and staff with firsthand experience in emergency management as well as in commanding military organizations in both homeland and overseas operations.

I. Creating a Sustainable Operational Reserve

Historically, the National Guard and Reserves have functioned as a strategic reserve force expected to be used to augment the active force only in the event of a major war, perhaps once in a generation or once in a lifetime. This role was defined in statute. It was a Cold War–era model that assumed long lead times to train and prepare reserve component forces to backfill active duty troops in response, for example, to the Russians rolling through Fulda Gap. That model began to change with the reserve call-up for the first Gulf War in 1990–91 and during the rest of the decade of the '90s, and changes have increased with the employment of reserve component forces since 9/11. The force resulting from this evolution has repeatedly been referred to as the “operational reserve,” and this transition to the operational reserve is highlighted in the DOD FY09 summary budget report (see pp. 108–12).

In our March 1 report, the Commission concluded that DOD had declared that we have an operational reserve without making the changes necessary to make such a force sustainable. It was the Commission’s view that continued use of the Guard and Reserves in this manner was neither feasible nor sustainable over time without major changes to law and policy. As my colleagues with me today will confirm, the Commission debated at great length the issue of whether we need an operational reserve. We were particularly concerned that the notion of an operational reserve had occurred almost by default, as a result of the need for more forces than were available in the active component. In our view, the nation effectively backed into the operational reserve. Contrary to what some may expect, this demand for reserve forces will likely continue long after U.S. engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan diminishes, owing to the nature of the threats we will face in the future both at home and abroad. Yet, there has been no public debate within Congress or among the American people on this dramatic change. There has been no formal adoption of the operational reserve. Steps taken by DOD and Congress thus far have not focused on an overarching set of alterations necessary to sustain the reserve components as a ready, rotational force that also retains necessary strategic elements and characteristics.

Almost 600,000 individuals have been mobilized in support of the global war on terror. More than 40 percent of the Selected Reserve has served since 9/11. In 2006, reservists on active duty totaled 61.3 million man-days – the equivalent of almost 168,000 full-time personnel. In the absence of the 600,000 national guardsmen and reservists mobilized as an operational reserve, and those on additional duty for the homeland, the nation would not have been able to sustain operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and to maintain requested force levels without a return to the draft. That reality – and its implications for the future – was the first reason the Commission endorsed continued reliance on an operational National Guard and Reserve force for both overseas and homeland missions.

The second compelling reason for having an operational Guard and Reserves is to address new threats in the homeland. We need to enhance DOD’s role in the homeland because the threats we face here at home are radically different than those we confronted at the peak of the Cold War. A terrorist’s use of a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) in a major metropolitan area would cause a catastrophe to which only the Department of Defense could respond: no other organization has the necessary capacity, capability, command and control, communications equipment, and mass casualty response personnel and equipment. For their appropriate role in responding to catastrophic events whether natural or man-made, such as the 15 National Security Planning scenarios identified by DHS, our National Guard and Reserve forces must be resourced, equipped, manned, and trained at a higher level of readiness than was appropriate when they were treated as a strategic reserve. This higher state of readiness is an essential element of a sustainable operational reserve.

The Reserve Components

There are seven reserve components of the United States’ armed forces. The Army has two reserve components: the Army National Guard of the United States and the Army Reserve. The Air Force also has two reserve components: the Air National Guard of the United States and the Air Force Reserve. The Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard each have one – the Navy Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve.

Unique among the reserve components, the Army National Guard and Air National Guard have both federal and state missions. While in federal service, the Army National Guard and Air National Guard are reserve components of their respective services and are referred to as the “Army National Guard of

the United States” and the “Air National Guard of the United States.” When not in federal service, the Army National Guard and Air National Guard are part of the federally recognized, organized militias of the several states and territories. They are trained, and have their officers appointed, under the 16th clause of section 8, article I of the United States Constitution. In addition, they are organized, armed, and equipped largely at federal expense. The governors of the states and territories serve as commanders in chief over their state’s Army National Guard and Air National Guard when those forces are not in federal service.

National Guard personnel may operate under three different statuses: state status, with state control and funding; Title 32 status, with state control and federal funding; and Title 10 status, with federal control and funding. While in state or Title 32 status, the National Guard operates under the command and control of the governor in accordance with state laws. The National Guard operating in state status is generally the “first military responder” to domestic incidents.

As the DOD *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support* notes, the National Guard is particularly well-suited to this role. It is “forward deployed” in 3,000 communities across the country, is readily accessible to state authorities, routinely exercises with law enforcement and first responders, and is “experienced in supporting [local] communities in times of crisis.” The National Guard, acting in state or Title 32 status, represented approximately 50,000 of the 72,000 troops that deployed in response to Hurricane Katrina. And the National Guard was first on the scene, together with the Coast Guard and some Title 10 reserve forces in the area.

Finally, the economics of the National Guard and Reserves underscore the desirability of their continued operational use supporting the active forces who lead overseas, and, supported by the active forces, playing the lead role for DOD in addressing threats in the homeland. Our analysis found that reservists are more cost-effective than active component personnel. Quantitatively, they are a cost-effective source of trained manpower, particularly as the cost of active duty manpower has grown exponentially in recent years. Our analysis of all the facts led us to the conclusion that the National Guard and Reserves are about 70 percent less expensive than the active components. In the area of compensation, for example, according to the Government Accountability Office, the per capita cost for an active duty service member was more than \$126,000 in 2006. That compares to \$19,000 per reserve component member.

On the qualitative side of the equation, reservists reside in and know their local communities, local officials, and local first responders. They bring unique civilian-acquired skills that are particularly critical in the event of catastrophes in the homeland – whether natural or man-made. We believe they have a distinct advantage over the active forces – operationally, geographically, in their skills, and, most importantly, in their cost.

For all these reasons, the Commission found overwhelming evidence that the nation requires an operational reserve force for the foreseeable future to meet the threats both overseas and in the homeland.

Notwithstanding our conclusion on the necessity of an operational reserve for the reasons just discussed, the Commission reiterates our March 1 concerns about sustainability. As our first recommendation in the final report declares, Congress and DOD must modify existing laws, policies, and regulations related to roles and missions, funding mechanisms, personnel rules, pay categories, equipping, training, mobilization, organization structure, and reserve component categories. The remainder of the report addresses these following specific issues in much greater detail:

- Enhancing DOD’s role in the homeland;
- Creating a continuum of service by instituting personnel management for an integrated total force;
- Developing a ready, capable, and available operational reserve;
- Supporting service members, families, and employers; and
- Reforming the organizations and institutions that support an operational reserve.

II. The Commission’s Homeland Recommendations in Its Final Report

For purposes of today’s hearing, we will be focusing on enhancing DOD’s role in the homeland. Today, the homeland is part of the battlefield, and the federal government must use all elements of national power to protect it. Dangers to the homeland include traditional military threats, such as conventional attacks on people and property, and more unorthodox ones, such as terrorist attacks. In addition, Hurricane Katrina and other recent devastating events have raised the public’s awareness of the hazards posed by catastrophic natural disasters.

As a result of these threats to the homeland and the new awareness of the danger, protecting the homeland has become a greater priority for all levels of government. The Commission believes that the Department of Defense must be fully prepared to protect American lives and property in the homeland. We know that the Department shares this view. To ensure full preparation, it must improve its capabilities and readiness to play a primary role in the response to major catastrophes that incapacitate civilian government over a wide geographic area. The Commission further believes that the National Guard and Reserves should play the lead role within DOD in supporting the Department of Homeland Security, other federal agencies, and the states in addressing these threats of priority equal to or higher than its warfighting mission.

Consistent with our recommendations in March 2007, the Commission concludes in our final report that DHS must define the requirement for capabilities it expects DOD to provide in responding to catastrophic incidents such as those in the 15 National Planning Scenarios. DOD must in turn include these requirements for civil support missions that it validates in its programming and budgeting process, and improve its capabilities and readiness to meet them.

In order to ensure that these steps occur, and that these missions are resourced appropriately, the Commission recommends that Congress define and assign these civil support responsibilities to DOD through statute. Such statutory language should clarify that DOD's homeland responsibilities are equal in priority to its combat responsibilities, and should codify the roles of the National Guard and Reserves in such responses. The Commission also recommends that U.S. Northern Command be reoriented into a command primarily manned by reserve component personnel more focused on the new threats in order to improve DOD's capabilities to respond. Congress also needs to pass a law that would enable DOD service Secretaries to call up Title 10 reservists to deal with imminent natural or man-made disasters. The Commission sets forth the following specific recommendations in Chapter II of its final report:

COMMISSION HOMELAND RECOMMENDATIONS

2. Congress should codify the Department of Defense's responsibility to provide support for civil authorities. This statutory language should include the acknowledgment that responding to natural and man-made disasters in the homeland is a core competency of DOD, of equal importance to its combat responsibilities. Congress should also clearly state that DOD should be prepared to provide the bulk of the response to a major catastrophe that incapacitates civilian government over a substantial geographic area and that DOD should initiate the necessary planning, training, and coordination for such events.
3. Consistent with DOD's *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support*, homeland defense and civil support should continue to be total force responsibilities. However, Congress should mandate that the National Guard and Reserves have the lead role in and form the backbone of DOD operations in the homeland. Furthermore, DOD should assign the National Guard and Reserves homeland defense and civil support as a core competency consistent with their required warfighting taskings and capabilities.
4. A majority of U.S. Northern Command's billets, including those for its service component commands, should be filled by leaders and staff with reserve qualifications and credentials. Job descriptions for senior leaders and other key positions at NORTHCOM should contain the requirement of significant Reserve or National Guard experience or service. In addition, either the officer serving in the position of the commander or the officer serving in the position of deputy commander of NORTHCOM should be a National Guard or Reserve officer at all times.
5. In accordance with §1815 of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, with the assistance of the Secretary of Defense, should generate civil support requirements, which the Department of Defense will be responsible for validating as appropriate. DOD should include civil support requirements in its programming and budgeting. As part of this effort, DOD should determine existing capabilities from all components that could fulfill civil support requirements and rebalance them where appropriate (consistent with their other obligations), shifting capabilities determined to be required for state-controlled response to domestic emergencies to the National Guard, and shifting capabilities currently resident in the National Guard that are not required for its state missions but are required for its federal missions either to the federal reserve components or to the active duty military, as appropriate.
6. The Secretary of Defense should ensure that forces identified as rapid responders to domestic catastrophes are manned, trained, and equipped to the highest levels of readiness.
7. As part of its efforts to develop plans for consequence management and support to civil authorities, DOD should develop protocols that allow governors to direct the efforts of federal military assets responding to an emergency such as a natural disaster. This direction may be accomplished through the governor's use of a dual-hatted military commander.

8. Congress should amend the mobilization statutes to provide service Secretaries the authority to involuntarily mobilize federal reserve components for up to 60 days in a four-month period and up to 120 days in a two-year period during or in response to imminent natural or man-made disasters, similar to that employed to mobilize the Coast Guard Reserve under 14 U.S.C. §712.

In the following sections, we explain the justifications for these proposals.

A. Budgeting and Programming for Civil Support (Recommendations ##5 and 6)

Department of Defense operations in the homeland contribute to homeland security in two ways: by performing homeland defense missions and by providing civil support. Homeland defense is the military defense of the homeland, while civil support is DOD support to other agencies in the performance of their mission. Civil support missions are often performed in support of homeland security operations, which are generally led by the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). *Homeland security* is not synonymous with *homeland defense*; rather, homeland security refers both to protecting the homeland against terrorism and to performing other non-terrorism-related DHS functions. In contrast, homeland defense is defined by DOD as the “protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats or aggression, or other threats as directed by the President.”

The Department of Defense provides defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) to federal agencies and to state and local governments in response to requests for assistance during domestic incidents. DSCA, also referred to more generically as “civil support,” is “DoD support, including [the use of] Federal military forces, the Department’s career civilian and contractor personnel, and DoD agency and component assets, for domestic emergencies and for designated law enforcement and other activities.” For defense support of civil authorities, the Secretary of Defense has the authority to approve the use of military personnel, units, supplies, and equipment. The Secretary also is responsible for providing overall policy and oversight for DSCA in the event of a domestic incident. Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs (ASD-HD&ASA) provides overall supervision for homeland defense and DSCA.

A key responsibility of the reserve components, particularly the National Guard, is supporting civil authorities. While “civil support” encompasses a variety of potential missions, such as support to law enforcement and emergency response, the most important homeland mission of National Guard and

Reserve units is saving lives and protecting property following a disaster. Their role in this area is indispensable, but it is important to remember that they represent only one part of the nation's capacity to prepare for and respond to disasters and emergencies. State and local government, including the National Guard in state status, plays a critical, frontline role in managing the response to natural disasters, terrorist attacks, and other domestic incidents. Most emergencies can and should be handled by state and local officials and the private sector with no or minimal involvement of DOD.

DOD views homeland defense as part of its core warfighting mission, and thus has taken on responsibility for it. DOD explicitly trains and equips its forces for homeland defense. The Joint Chiefs of Staff's document on homeland defense, Joint Publication 3-27, states: "DOD is responsible for the [homeland defense] mission, and therefore leads the [homeland defense] response, with other departments and agencies in support of DOD efforts."

In contrast, the Department of Defense historically has viewed civil support as a "lesser included" mission and a lower priority. Although DOD has consistently stated in its policy documents, including the *National Defense Strategy*, that protecting the homeland is its most important function, the Department historically has not made civil support a priority. Rather, DOD has sought to perform civil support missions by relying primarily on "dual-capable forces." DOD's Joint Publication 3-28, "Civil Support," describes this policy: "[civil support] capabilities are derived from Department of Defense (DOD) warfighting capabilities that could be applied to foreign/domestic assistance or law enforcement support missions." In fact, Department of Defense Directive 3025.1 explicitly prohibits DOD from procuring or maintaining supplies, materiel, or equipment for providing support in civil emergencies. To perform civil support missions, DOD has instead utilized equipment procured and personnel trained for warfighting-related missions.

The Commission's March 1 Report and DOD's and Congress's Response

In our March 1 report, the Commission criticized as a "flawed assumption" DOD's position that preparing for and responding to emergencies and disasters is simply a subset of another capability, and recommended that "the Secretary of Homeland Security, with the assistance of the Secretary of Defense, should generate civil support requirements which the Department of Defense will be responsible for validating as appropriate" and which DOD should include in its programming and budgeting.

Following the publication of our March 1 report, the Secretary of Defense agreed that the Defense Department must begin to program and budget for civil support. This was a very favorable and breakthrough development. We know that the current Secretary of Defense and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs holds such programming and budgeting to be a very high priority and has the Department working hard to fulfill this goal.

Congress mandated in section 1815 of the recently enacted National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 ("Determination of Department of Defense Civil Support Requirements") that "the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall determine the military-unique capabilities needed to be provided by the Department of Defense to support civil authorities in an incident of national significance or a catastrophic incident." Congress in the same section also mandated that the Secretary of Defense develop and implement a plan to fund civil support capabilities in the Department of Defense, and delineate the elements of the plan in DOD's budget materials. Passage of this legislation was another significant step toward addressing the concerns raised by the Commission's earlier report, as well as by many, many other expert reports and after-action commentaries.

Progress on Programming and Planning for Civil Support

The fact that there is no formal budgeting and programming process for civil support does not mean that DOD has not prepared for its civil support missions. For instance, the National Guard Bureau (NGB) has attempted to ensure that the National Guard is prepared to perform its civil support responsibilities by identifying the "essential 10" warfighting capabilities inherent in National Guard units for Title 10 missions, and also essential for missions on the homeland.

DOD has used the 15 National Planning Scenarios prepared by the President's Homeland Security Council – which contemplate natural and man-made catastrophes with high loss of life – to develop an understanding of which capabilities will be required to respond to the disasters.

U.S. Northern Command has “developed 25 pre-scripted mission assignments to respond to specific predetermined requests for assistance from designated lead agencies,” such as FEMA; NORTHCOM has also conducted major exercises to improve planning and coordination, and to identify shortfalls.

Congress authorized the creation of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives consequence management (CBRNE-CM) response forces, such as the weapons of mass destruction civil support teams (WMD-CSTs).

Moreover, as discussed below, DOD has created force packages, now in various stages of development, to respond to domestic CBRNE events; these include the USMCR Chemical, Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF), CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces (CCMRFs), and, led by the NGB, CBRNE enhanced response force packages (CERFPs). Each of these response capabilities represents an improvement over what had existed before. However, more needs to be done.

CBRNE Consequence Management

Experts estimate that the detonation of a 10-kiloton nuclear device in a major metropolitan area would result in hundreds of thousands of people killed, hundreds of thousands injured, more than a million residents displaced, a large geographic area affected by nuclear fallout or contamination, and significant disruption of communications capabilities and capabilities of civilian government. Such estimates are not news to this Committee, as you have previous testimony on the record in this area.

For good reason, then, CBRNE consequence management is a key civil support responsibility for DOD. Should a catastrophic event occur, DOD will be expected to respond rapidly and massively. No other agency of government has the resources and capability to deal with such a major catastrophe in the homeland. DOD therefore must be manned, trained, and equipped to do so. This effort should include ensuring that all forces assigned and needed for domestic CBRNE consequence management are fully budgeted for, sourced, manned, trained, and equipped.

The Joint Staff defines CBRNE consequence management (CBRNE-CM) in the homeland as “those actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, man-made, or terrorist incidents. CBRNE-CM may include

measures to restore essential government services, protect public health and safety, and provide emergency relief to affected governments, businesses, and individuals.” As stated in DOD’s *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support*, consequence management for CBRNE mass casualty attacks is the Department’s most important civil support objective. In the event of a catastrophic CBRNE incident, DOD can be expected to assist in responding to the massive disruption of the “production and delivery of essential goods and services.”

The potential missions are diverse and may include providing public safety and security, supporting public health, and responding to terrain and infrastructure contamination. While not all CBRNE incidents will require a federal response, those that do will be coordinated through the National Response Framework, with DOD assisting the lead federal agency. In addition, the affected state or states can be expected to respond massively, with the National Guard of the affected state and those surrounding it (deployed pursuant to Emergency Management Assistance Compacts, or EMACs) playing a major role.

Because of the priority it already assigns to this mission, DOD seeks to ensure that appropriate responders are available for the CBRNE domestic consequence management mission. As discussed above, the U.S. military organizes, trains, and equips forces primarily to conduct combat operations and considers the capability to conduct civil support missions to be inherent within its combat capabilities. CBRNE-CM generally follows this policy, but does employ some dedicated CBRNE consequence management responders and related units. These include

- **NORTHCOM’s Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS):** a standing joint task force, staffed by 160 personnel and commanded by a two-star Army National Guard general in Title 10 status, that plans and integrates DOD support for domestic CBRNE consequence management. In the event of a domestic CBRNE incident, JTF-CS will deploy to the incident site to exercise command and control over federal military forces.
- **National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs):** 22-member National Guard units operating in Title 32 status. WMD-CSTs are tasked with identifying CBRNE agents or substances, assessing the consequences of the event, advising on response measures, and assisting with requests for state and federal support. Congress has authorized 55 WMD-CSTs – one for every state and territory.

- **National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFPs):** National Guard force packages created to assist local, state, and federal authorities in CBRNE consequence management and to fill the anticipated 6- to 72-hour gap between the first response and the federal response to a catastrophic incident. CERFPs combine four elements from existing National Guard units: search and extraction, decontamination, medical, and command and control. They operate in state or Title 32 status, but may be federalized under “extraordinary circumstances.” There are 17 CERFPs, 12 of which are assigned to the 10 FEMA regions.
- **CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces (CCMRFs):** three Title 10 force packages at different levels of readiness consisting of several thousand joint personnel from separate units identified and organized to perform CBRNE consequence management missions, with capabilities including medical, decontamination, communications, logistics, transportation, and public affairs. The National Guard is currently designated to provide much of the manpower associated with the CCMRFs.
- **U.S. Marine Corps Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF):** a Title 10 unit consisting of several hundred personnel capable of “providing capabilities for agent detection and identification, casualty search and rescue, personnel decontamination, emergency medical care, and stabilization of contaminated personnel.”

Mr. Chairman, this is real progress from where this nation was on September 11. However, as impressive as the capabilities of these units are that exist today, we are still a long, long way from having all the highly skilled, specially equipped, highly trained forces required in sufficient numbers and at the highest state of readiness to respond to the catastrophe scenarios.

Efforts are now being made to identify the gaps present in homeland security and civil support capabilities, but they do not appear to be fully coordinated. Three major homeland security and civil support assessments are currently under way. First, DHS has drawn on the National Preparedness System (NPS) and Target Capabilities List (TCL) to develop an assessment system evaluating the preparedness of the state and federal government. Such preparedness efforts are designed to maximize the nation’s ability to respond under the National Response Plan and the successor to this emergency response plan, the National Response Framework. Second, the National Guard Bureau is developing the Joint Capabilities Database, which will give each state “the ability to provide near-real-time input on unit status and availability [of its National Guard] in each [emergency response] capability area.” Finally, NORTHCOM is leading a “homeland defense and civil support capabilities based assessment [that will] provide detailed information on gaps in DOD’s [homeland defense and civil support capabilities in order] to influence and inform decisions on managing risk and allocating resources.” The

DHS, NGB, and NORTHCOM assessments are all at varying levels of maturity; none is yet complete. Moreover, although the three studies should provide useful information, there appears to be no overarching strategy for translating these assessments into requirements.

As the state of these assessments indicate, there has been no formal process to generate civil support requirements or to budget and program for civil support missions, no comprehensive assessment of how DOD's requirements for civil support should be balanced against its other priorities, and insufficient planning on fully organizing, manning, training, and equipping DOD forces for catastrophe response.

Because the nation has neither adequately identified the requirements related to nor adequately resourced its forces designated for response to weapons of mass destruction, it does not have sufficient trained, ready forces available for that mission. In our report, we call this an **appalling gap**, though we are certainly not claiming to be the first to recognize it.

The Role of DHS

The Commission believes that the requirements generation process should begin with DHS. By statute and policy, DHS is central to national preparedness efforts: it is the federal agency with the most comprehensive national perspective on the response capabilities present in federal, state, and local government. Therefore, it is the agency with the expertise and the responsibility to inform DOD of which capabilities the Department will be expected to provide in response to a catastrophe. Although DOD and DHS have worked together on planning, exercising, and other efforts, such as developing NORTHCOM's pre-scripted mission assignments and carrying out exercises such as Ardent Sentry, DHS has not provided DOD with requirements for civil support.

The failure by DHS to take this critical first step in the budgeting and programming process is a major flaw in how DHS and DOD prepare for DOD's civil support mission. However, it should in no way be used as an excuse to delay or set back efforts in progress within DOD to fund and enhance DOD civil support capabilities. The recommended changes should instead build on those positive efforts DOD currently has under way.

The goal of these efforts should be to identify those requirements necessary to create an operational National Guard and Reserve that is able to augment and reinforce the active component overseas and to perform the homeland missions that are so critically important. **The Secretary of Defense should ensure that forces identified as rapid responders to domestic catastrophes are manned, trained, and equipped to the highest levels of readiness.** The required National Guard and Reserve units must be fully equipped, fully manned, fully trained, and fully ready to respond in the homeland, just as the “ready battalion” of the 82nd Airborne or First Marine Division or strategic airlift and tankers are for the overseas mission.

B. Making Civil Support a Statutory Responsibility (Recommendations ##2 and 3)

The Department of Defense has historically placed a low priority on civil support, viewing it as a “lesser-included” or “derivative” capability of its core warfighting responsibility and not one for which it must budget and program. The DOD leadership has clearly changed its stance in this area and is willing to raise the priority given civil support. The Office of the Secretary of Defense recently agreed that civil support is a role for which the Defense Department must begin to program and budget. Congress has also taken this position in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. These are both extremely important steps in the right direction.

But despite these positive developments, there is no guarantee that civil support will remain a high priority. With a change in administration, it could return to its historical place as a “derivative” capability, as it was for many years prior to the current leadership. The Commission believes that the best way to avoid this outcome is for Congress to explicitly charge the Department of Defense with the statutory responsibility to provide civil support. Doing so will ensure that the Department continues to move in the right direction and will clearly signal that this and future congresses intend to hold it accountable for its supporting role in homeland security.

While the Stafford Act and other statutes authorize DOD to conduct civil support operations, these statutes do not constitute a sufficient formal charge of responsibility. The Commission believes that only such a statutory mandate will ensure that DOD, now and in the future, shifts its priorities and commits sufficient resources to planning, training, and exercising for homeland missions.

This statutory mandate should have several elements. It should make clear that DOD has the responsibility to carry out civil support missions when called upon to do so; it should state that responding to natural or man-made disasters in the homeland is a core competency of DOD that is equal in priority to its combat responsibilities; it should make clear that in the event of a major catastrophe incapacitating civilian government over a wide geographic area, DOD can be expected to provide the bulk of the response; and it should assign the National Guard and Reserves the lead role within DOD for catastrophe response. The last point warrants further explanation.

The United States armed forces are guided by the Total Force Policy. Under this policy, all components of the armed forces – active and reserve – act as a homogeneous whole. They are viewed as a single force when the Department considers the best way to meet national security requirements. As a result, the active and reserve components are assigned missions on the basis of which unit is best able to fulfill specific national security requirements.

Under this Total Force Policy, the National Guard and Reserves are the most important elements of the Department of Defense for protecting the homeland. While DOD and other policy documents generally recognize this fact, they have not sufficiently clarified the role that the reserve components currently play and should play in the future.

A tremendous amount of homeland-related capability resides in the reserve components, which are located in communities throughout the nation. The reserve components – the National Guard and the Title 10 reserve components – consist of more than 1.1 million men and women based in almost 5,000 facilities throughout the United States and the U.S. territories. The connections with their communities foster public support for and trust of military members, and this relationship can be indispensable when disaster strikes at home.

The National Guard's experience, skill sets, and nationwide dispersal make it particularly well-suited for civil support operations. State emergency response is its most important responsibility when it is not under federal control. National guardsmen often are the first military responders. Because of its unique, constitutionally designated status as both a state and a federal force, the National Guard is able to function as a key element of state emergency response, as a state responder, and as a coordinator of the

federal military and state response. For this reason, the National Guard has long experience in civil support missions. At a recent congressional hearing, Lieutenant General H Steven Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, noted that during 2006–07 alone, the states had more than “100,000 soldiers and airmen . . . supporting Homeland Security missions.”

The Army National Guard is structured to provide large formation combat arms capabilities for overseas missions. These forces, and the combat support and combat service support capabilities they represent, also are useful at home. The National Guard is not the only reserve component important to civil support, however. The U.S. Army Reserve, for example, is primarily made up of combat support and combat service support units – such as military police, civil affairs, transportation, and medical personnel – that are widely dispersed across the country and could be extremely valuable in emergency response. Army Reserve units have skilled medical professionals, hazardous material reconnaissance teams, and casualty extraction, mass casualty decontamination, engineer, aviation, and water purification units that would be very useful for catastrophe response. Other reserve components and members also have specialized capabilities, such as those in the emergency response field, that are vital to consequence management and exist only in the reserves.

The Commission believes that DOD should take the reserve components’ expertise in homeland operations and refine it so that they will become the backbone of future homeland operations. If DOD is to make civil support a core mission, its forces need to reflect that doctrine. The most efficient means to that end would be to amplify the current homeland capabilities present in the reserve components. The Commission therefore recommends that Congress explicitly recognize the function that the reserve components should play in the homeland by assigning to them a leadership role in the homeland.

Mr. Chairman, this recommendation is commonsense and should not be controversial, as we believe it reflects the current direction of DOD. It in no way should be taken as suggesting that the overseas warfighting capability of the reserve components should be reduced.

In increasing the priority of the civil support mission, both within the Department as a whole and for the National Guard and Reserves in particular, our final report stresses that “the Department should not compromise the reserve components’ ability to perform their warfighting responsibilities” (p. 96). In

other words, neither the National Guard nor any other reserve component should be converted into an exclusively domestic disaster response force, nor do we believe this would be the effect if our recommendations were implemented.

Rather, as we make clear, once the civil support requirements are identified, DOD should undertake any rebalancing, as appropriate – among the active and reserve components – “to ensure that those capabilities useful for civil support reside, where practicable, in the reserve components, and are readily accessible for civil support-related missions” (p. 96). The Commission was not in a position to determine what, if any, shifting of capabilities among components would in fact be appropriate, since no civil support requirements have yet been generated by DHS or validated by DOD. The overseas warfighting capabilities of the National Guard and Reserves will absolutely be required now and for the future, and the Commission’s recommendations in no way call that reality into question.

C. Integrating the Reserve Components at U.S. Northern Command (Recommendation #4)

Paralleling the reserve components’ increased role in the homeland is the need for U.S. Northern Command, like the rest of DOD, to more fully integrate the reserve components into its homeland mission. NORTHCOM is the unified command with primary responsibility for homeland defense and civil support missions. Joint Publication 3-26, “Homeland Security,” reflecting the Unified Command Plan, describes its mission as “conduct[ing] operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests within the assigned area of responsibility (AOR) and as directed by the President or SecDef [Secretary of Defense], provide military assistance to civil authorities including [consequence management] operations. USNORTHCOM [is] . . . the single, responsible, designated DOD commander for overall command and control of DOD support to civil authorities within the USNORTHCOM AOR.” In practice, NORTHCOM views homeland defense, but not civil support, as its highest priority.

NORTHCOM has few forces permanently assigned to it; it provides defense support of civil authorities primarily through its subordinate and service-specific commands, such as Joint Task Force Civil Support, Army North, and Air Force North. NORTHCOM does not command National Guard forces in state or Title 32 status.

As already noted, DOD has not engaged the reserve components in the homeland mission in a manner that takes full advantage of their skills and experience. This shortcoming, along with the lack of a civil support requirements definition, programming, and budgeting process, has been carried over into how NORTHCOM is organized. In our March report, the Commission concluded that “U.S. Northern Command does not adequately consider and utilize all military components – active and reserve, including the National Guard – in planning, training, and exercising and in the conduct of military operations while in support of a governor, in support of another lead federal agency, or in the defense of America.”

As DOD makes civil support a core function and begins to budget and program for civil support as now required by law, NORTHCOM must elevate civil support’s priority so that both it and homeland defense become core missions of the command. To that end, more must be done to integrate the reserve components into NORTHCOM.

Although there has been progress since we issued that earlier report, the Commission continues to find wanting the planning efforts of NORTHCOM. It still does not adequately consider and plan for the utilization of all military components, active and reserve (including the National Guard serving under the command of state governors), in its planning, training, and exercising for support to civil authorities.

NORTHCOM must incorporate personnel who have greater knowledge of National Guard and Reserve capabilities, strengths, and constraints and must assemble a cadre of experts on the intricacies of state and local governments, law enforcement, and emergency response. Such knowledge currently resides in the National Guard and Reserves and, despite the Commission’s earlier recommendations, remains untapped and unintegrated, in disparate commands.

The Commission therefore reiterates in our final report our recommendation that a majority of U.S. Northern Command’s billets, including those for its service component commands, should be filled by leaders with reserve qualifications and credentials. A larger percentage of reservists on the staff and in key leadership positions, including in the position of commander or deputy commander, would provide NORTHCOM with greater insight into the unique skills and strengths available in the reserve forces. Increasing the numbers of members of the National Guard and Reserves within the service components

of NORTHCOM would ensure that those preparing and coordinating homeland missions will consider the unique contributions of the reserve component. Having less than 10 percent of its full-time billets and few senior billets allocated to the National Guard and Reserve, as we found was the case when writing our interim report, hardly provides the type of integration and experience required. We also believe that the reserve qualifications and credentials must be substantive – mere exposure to the reserve components would be insufficient.

D. Governors' Authority to Direct Military Forces in Disaster Response (Recommendation #7)

As chief executives, governors bear the primary responsibility of protecting life and property within their state. Each also serves as the commander in chief of his or her state National Guard when it is not in federal service. This authority originates in the Constitution and is consistent with current U.S. law and policy, which establishes that domestic incidents are managed at the lowest jurisdictional level possible and that lower jurisdictional levels are supported by additional response capabilities when necessary.

Governors command their state's National Guard and frequently deploy it in response to domestic incidents, such as natural disasters or civil unrest. The President may also deploy Title 10 military forces to a state as part of disaster response. Such a civil support operation is likely to be undertaken as part of a larger operation coordinated by DHS and its component FEMA.

Under existing procedures, if a major crisis occurs in a state where both federal and non-federal (National Guard under state control) forces provide civil support, military assistance is coordinated in two ways. NORTHCOM controls the movement of Title 10 active and reserve forces into the state and maintains command and control over them through a joint task force. Simultaneously, the state, aided by the National Guard Bureau, coordinates the movement of all National Guard forces in Title 32 status; once they are in a state, they are commanded by the governor as if they were National Guard forces of that state. This dual coordination leads to two separate chains of command for military forces in the state. One chain of command leads from Title 10 forces through NORTHCOM to the President, while another leads to the governor. Although the governor may request assistance from Title 10 military forces within the state, he or she does not have the authority to direct them. This dual reporting could

cause confusion, wasted or duplicated effort, and even potentially greater loss of life and property in a catastrophe response.

To remedy this problem, the Commission recommends that as part of its efforts to develop plans for consequence management and support to civil authorities, DOD should develop protocols to allow governors to direct the efforts of federal military assets responding to an emergency such as a natural disaster. This direction may be accomplished through the governor's use of a dual-hatted military commander.

We want to be clear that this recommendation does not, in our view, in any way violate the President's authority as the commander in chief over federal forces, an authority conferred by Article II of the Constitution; does not imply that all 50 state governors would be routinely allowed access to federal forces; and does not imply that all Title 10 forces participating in a response necessarily would be subject to direction by a governor (for example, there might be no logical reason for the governor to direct naval forces).

Rather, relying on protocols arranged in advance of a disaster, it would allow the President for some defined period of time to "chop" a portion of his or her command authority over particular identified federal forces – the portion for operational control – to a state's governor who is in charge of the disaster response. The federal forces could be part of a joint federal–state military task force commanded by an officer dual-hatted under Title 10 and Title 32. The Commission believes that this method would be more effective in achieving unity of effort in those instances where the disaster response is led by the governor of a state than the approach taken in Hurricane Katrina, when Title 10 and National Guard forces responding in the Gulf Coast were under separate control.

Governors routinely command National Guard troops from other states in disaster response. If governors can be trusted to direct National Guard soldiers from their own state or from other states, then they can be trusted under similar circumstances to direct federal active and reserve component forces as well. Nor is the assignment of active duty personnel to Title 32 National Guard commands a novel undertaking. Federal law specifically authorizes that both enlisted members and commissioned officers may be

detailed for duty with a state National Guard. In fact, Title 10 officers detailed in this fashion may accept a commission in the National Guard.

In addition, current military doctrine explicitly allows members of the United States armed forces to serve under the operational control of foreign commanders, with the President retaining ultimate command over U.S. forces. If the command relationship with the President can be maintained while American troops are operating under the control of foreign commanders, we see no convincing reason that it cannot be maintained by prearranged agreement while troops are under the control of a state governor acting through the adjutant general.

Analysts from the Rand Corporation discussed this issue in a 2007 report, *Hurricane Katrina: Lessons for Army Planning and Operations*. They noted,

When U.S. forces conduct multilateral operations that are led by foreign commanders, they are placed under the operational control of that commander. This issue was examined thoroughly in 1993 during the drafting of Presidential Decision Directive 25, Reforming Multilateral Peacekeeping Operations. During this deliberative process, each of the services, the joint staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense agreed that this type of arrangement preserved the federal chain of command and, therefore, was not a violation of existing federal statutes or military practices. Using the logic and rationale employed in PDD-25, there is no legal reason why federal forces could not be temporarily placed under the tactical control of individual states for a specific time, place, and mission. (p. 66)

E. Activating Title 10 Reserves for All-Hazards Preparation and Response (Recommendation #8)

Finally, the Commission recommends that Congress amend the mobilization statutes to provide service Secretaries the authority to involuntarily mobilize federal reserve components for up to 60 days in a four-month period and up to 120 days in a two-year period during or in response to imminent natural or man-made disasters. Under this proposal, access would be allowed to the federal reserve components for all-hazards response prior to or after a disaster similar to the access now available to the Secretary of Homeland Security with regard to the U.S. Coast Guard. No such statutory authority exists today. The need for such an authority was underscored by General Peter Schoomaker, then Army Chief of Staff, when he testified before the Commission about the homeland-related responsibilities of the Army Reserve. The Commission believes there should be a statutory mechanism allowing greater access to Title 10 reserve forces for all-hazards civil support operations.

III. Other Recommendations Necessary to Sustain the Operational Reserve

On the basis of our research, the Commission came to the inescapable conclusion that sustaining an operational reserve force in the 21st century will require major changes. Conclusions and recommendations relevant to the homeland activities of the operational reserve are found in a number of other sections of the Commission's report.

Changes to Reserve Component Categories

The Commission recommends a change in how the total manpower pool should be managed so that our armed forces can accommodate homeland and overseas missions, fully implementing a structure often referred to as the "continuum of service." Today, there is an active duty force of 1.4 million personnel; the National Guard and Reserve force contains about 800,000 personnel in units, and another 300,000 in the Individual Ready Reserve. The retiree pool contains about 1.9 million people. Beyond that, there is the Selective Service System, which registers more than 6,000 young men every day.

The Commission envisions moving from the traditional, little-used strategic reserve force to a future structure which includes parts of the force that serve operationally on rotational deployment tours and others that provide strategic depth to the force but may not be required to be kept at such a high state of readiness. These changes are illustrated in the attached charts. The new reserve component categories we have recommended will facilitate a continuum of service, with easy transitions for members along a continuum spanning full-time service to low annual requirements of those who agree to serve when needed but most of the time participate minimally. To make this continuum a reality, we need an integrated pay and personnel system, an integrated retirement system, duty status reform, an integrated, total force management system, and other reforms. Our force planners – if they have a mission, if they have a requirement to meet a contingency overseas or a contingency here at home – must be able to draw from this total force pool of manpower.

The Commission believes that the existing reserve component categories, which were instituted in response to the Cold War, should be replaced with two new categories. In the Operational Reserve Force, the Department would put those units required to be kept at the highest level of readiness, those units that are getting ready to deploy overseas, and individuals in various full-time assignments, such as

serving on the staff of the U.S. Northern Command or some other command, or in the Pentagon. The second category would be the Strategic Reserve Force, consisting of the Strategic Ready Reserve Force and the Strategic Standby Reserve. In the Strategic Ready Reserve would be units kept ready to be capable of activation and deployment if needed, individuals who have time left on their military service obligation or who have kept their military skills current through training and duty activities, and recently retired members (regular or reserve) who are viable mobilization assets. Those retirees who could not be activated immediately and all those in today's Individual Ready Reserve who are not in the Strategic Ready Reserve Force would be placed in the Strategic Standby Ready Reserve. Finally, if the mobilization of all these personnel could not meet the requirements of a major war, the Selective Service System would be engaged.

Equipment and Readiness

Congress tasked the Commission to assess how effectively the organization and funding structures of the National Guard and Reserve are achieving operational and personnel readiness. An operational reserve requires a higher standard of readiness, for a greater duration, with less time to restore readiness levels between deployments. The Cold War-era model relied on a lengthy period of time – post-mobilization – to address training shortfalls, update equipment, and fix such problems as individual medical readiness. That framework is out of sync with the periodic and sustained rotational use of the National Guard and Reserves envisioned in the current manpower planning models, such as the Army's Force Generation Model. ARFORGEN is instead designed to rely on a "train, mobilize, deploy" model that will require increasing levels of readiness for several years prior to deployment. Sustained operational use of the reserve component will make it necessary to devise a very different way of doing business.

The Department of Defense must improve the readiness of the National Guard and Reserves, in the homeland and overseas. The readiness of units and of individuals varies greatly among the services, and the differences relate largely to funding. In our March 1 report, we said that 88 percent of Army National Guard combat forces here in the United States were not ready. On the basis of information we received from Department of Defense officials shortly before publication of our final report, we believe that this assessment of National Guard readiness remains accurate. In fact, the situation is a little worse. There are a number of improvements in the pipeline that should improve National Guard readiness in future years. But as Army Chief of Staff General Casey has testified in recent months, Army readiness is being consumed as fast as we can build it.

With the exception of those reserve forces deployed or just getting ready to deploy, readiness of the Army Guard units at home in their states is extremely low. Their unreadiness leaves us at greater risk should the nation suffer a catastrophic WMD attack on our homeland or a natural disaster inflicting greater damage than did Hurricane Katrina. As discussed above, we recommend in our report that National Guard and Reserve units required to be ready to respond domestically to a catastrophe be maintained at higher readiness levels than were routinely maintained in the past.

We recognize that most of the problems in this area are not new; they have arisen because Cold War policies and laws remain in effect while the reserve components are being used in ways never envisioned when those policies were developed. Policies that allowed cascaded equipping and tiered readiness for the Army reserve components resulted in those forces being largely “not ready” before 9/11. That the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have exacerbated readiness problems should come as no surprise.

We also recommend that the Department expand and improve on its readiness reporting system in ways that both provide operational planners more details and also answer the question “ready for what?” Today, in the readiness reporting system managed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the standards by which all units are measured are determined by their wartime missions. They are not assessed for their capability to respond to crises here at home. The system we envision should be common across all services and components, contain data from the individual through the major unit level, and report on readiness for a full spectrum of missions, including support to civil authorities. The Defense Readiness Reporting System currently being put into operation by the Department may be a start on the road to such a comprehensive system, but progress on its implementation has been slow.

We also recommend that DOD conduct zero-based reviews of the reserve components’ equipment and levels of full-time support personnel. Adequate levels of equipment are critical for realistic training, particularly as a unit moves into its force generation model deployment cycle. Equally critical are the full-time support personnel who both maintain that equipment and ensure that reserve component units are trained to the standards that the active component expects from an operational reserve force. We are familiar with current service plans to fund these areas, but we are skeptical that existing requirements, based on Cold War tables of organization and equipping, are accurate. The requirements for reserve forces employed operationally overseas and prepared to

respond to catastrophes here at home will surely differ from those developed for a once-in-a-generation conflict against the Soviet Union. Most of the expense of funding the necessary equipment and personnel is already budgeted in service plans. The Army G-8, Lieutenant General Stephen Speakes, told us that current Army plans include full funding to equip Guard and Reserve units and meet full-time support requirements. We are recommending that these plans be modified in accordance with the zero-based reviews, and that funding for these requirements be accelerated.

Individual medical readiness, particularly dental readiness, was a serious issue during mobilization for the first Gulf War. It has remained a significant problem for some reserve components during mobilizations for Iraq and Afghanistan. New force generation models will provide much less time post-mobilization for needed fixes, and no-notice catastrophic events provide even less. As in the case of training, any remedial work will have to be completed pre-mobilization. In the Commission's view, ensuring individual medical readiness for an operational reserve force is a corporate responsibility of the Department of Defense, as well as a responsibility of the individual service member. We recommend a number of changes to ensure that service Secretaries have the authority to provide the medical and dental screening and care necessary to make certain that service members meet the applicable medical and dental standards for deployment.

Personnel Management

We can no longer rely on personnel management laws, policies, and systems that are a relic of the Cold War era. DOD's personnel management strategies must instead foster a continuum of service as part of an integrated total force. As generally understood, a continuum of service would facilitate the seamless transition of individual reservists on and off of active duty to meet mission requirements and would permit different levels of participation by service members over the course of a military career. The integrated total force management necessary to achieve this continuum is the next phase of reforms required to achieve the enhanced military effectiveness envisioned by Congress in enacting the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

Two critical enablers of an enhanced continuum of service are a reduction in the number of duty status categories and the implementation of an integrated pay and personnel system. Equally important, however, is an integrated personnel management system that, when fully mature at some point in the future, would include an integrated promotion system, integrated compensation system, and integrated retirement system.

Conclusion

Commissioners are honored to have been selected to undertake the most comprehensive, independent review of National Guard and Reserve forces in the past 60 years. Many of today's profound challenges to the National Guard and Reserves will persist, notwithstanding force reductions in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is particularly true for threats to the homeland. Thus, the need for major reforms is urgent regardless of the outcome of current conflicts. The Commission believes that the nation must look past the immediate challenges and focus on the long-term future of the National Guard and Reserves and their role in protecting the United States' vital national security interests at home and abroad. We have labored to identify and categorize the challenges that must be addressed, and have proffered a series of recommendations to address those challenges. We understand that responsibility for implementation is the purview of Congress and the executive branch. We hope that our report conveys an appropriate sense of urgency, and we are confident that you will build on and improve upon our efforts, particularly in the homeland.

COMMISSIONER BIOGRAPHIES

Arnold L. Punaro, Chairman

Chairman Punaro is a retired Marine Corps major general who served as Commanding General of the 4th Marine Division (1997–2000) and Director of Reserve Affairs at Headquarters Marine Corps during the post-9/11 peak reserve mobilization periods. Following active duty service in Vietnam, he was mobilized three times: for Operation Desert Shield in the first Gulf War in 1990, to command Joint Task Force Provide Promise (Fwd) in Bosnia and Macedonia in 1993, and for Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. He worked on Capitol Hill for 24 years for Senator Sam Nunn and served as his staff director of the Senate Armed Services Committee for 14 years. In 1997, he chaired the Defense Reform Task Force for then Secretary of Defense William Cohen; in 2007, he was a member of the independent commission assessing the Iraqi security forces; he is a member of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates's Defense Business Board. He serves on the board of directors of the National Defense Industrial Association and the Atlantic Council. He is currently Executive Vice President of Science Applications International Corporation.

William L. Ball, III

Commissioner Ball was Secretary of the Navy during the Reagan administration. He currently chairs the Board of Trustees of the Asia Foundation, an international NGO operating in 18 Asian countries. His service on active duty in the Navy in the early 1970s was followed by 10 years on the U.S. Senate staff for Senators Herman Talmadge and John Tower. In 1985 he became Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, and then served on the White House staff for two years as Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs. He presently is managing director of the Loeffler Group, a government affairs practice in Washington, DC, and Texas.

Les Brownlee

Commissioner Brownlee was confirmed as the Under Secretary of the Army in November 2001 and served concurrently as the Acting Secretary of the Army from May 2003 to November 2004. He was appointed first by Senator Strom Thurmond in March 1996 and later by Senator John Warner in January 1999 to serve as the staff director of the Senate Armed Services Committee. He is a retired U.S. Army colonel and served two combat tours in Vietnam. He is currently President of Les Brownlee & Associates LLC.

Rhett Dawson

Commissioner Dawson is President and CEO of the Information Technology Industry Council. His private-sector experience includes the private practice of law and tenure as senior vice president, law and public policy, of a Fortune 500 company. During the Reagan administration, he was Assistant to the President for Operations, and earlier in his career he served as staff director of the Senate Armed Services Committee. He served on active duty as an ROTC-commissioned Army officer for three years.

Larry K. Eckles

Commissioner Eckles retired as the Assistant Division Commander of the 35th Infantry Division, headquartered at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, after 37 years of service. He retired with more than 31 years of full-time civil service employment with the Nebraska Army National Guard and has served in numerous positions at state headquarters, including chief of staff of the Nebraska Army National Guard, director of personnel, and battalion commander.

Patricia L. Lewis

Commissioner Lewis served more than 28 years with the federal government, including service with the Senate Armed Services Committee for Chairmen John Warner, Sam Nunn, and Scoop Jackson. Ms. Lewis began her federal career in 1975 with the Department of the Navy and has held positions in Naval Sea Systems Command, the Office of the Navy Comptroller, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. She is currently a partner with Monfort-Lewis, LLC.

Dan McKinnon

Commissioner McKinnon was founder, Chairman, and CEO of North American Airlines, a worldwide charter and scheduled large jet airline. He undertook special projects for the Director of Central Intelligence and also served as Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, during which time he oversaw the implementation of airline deregulation. He has owned country music radio stations in San Diego. Early in his career, he spent four years as an aviator in the United States Navy, where he set, and holds, the U.S. Navy helicopter peacetime air/sea record of 62 saves.

Wade Rowley

Commissioner Rowley is currently Senior Vice President for Business Development for Otay Group, Inc., and was formerly a military border infrastructure construction consultant for U.S. Customs and Border Protection. He served 9 years of enlisted and more than 14 years of commissioned service with the Army National Guard. His last military assignment was with the California Army National Guard, where he served for 10 years on active duty for special work as an engineer project officer, company commander, and facilities support commander for the California National Guard Counterdrug Task Force. He was responsible for support in the development, project management, and installation of all aspects of border infrastructure in support of the U.S. Border Patrol.

James E. Sherrard III

Commissioner Sherrard served as Chief of Air Force Reserve, Headquarters USAF, Washington, DC, and Commander, Air Force Reserve Command, Robins AFB, Georgia, from 1998 to 2004. He is a retired lieutenant general with more than 38 years of commissioned service in the United States Air Force. As Chief of Air Force Reserve and Commander, Air Force Reserve Command, he was responsible for organizing, training, and equipping more than 79,000 military and civil service personnel required to support operations and combat readiness training for 36 flying wings, 14 detached groups, 13 Air Force Reserve installations, three Numbered Air Forces, and the Air Reserve Personnel Center (ARPC). As Chief of Air Force Reserve, he directed and oversaw the mobilization of Air Force Reserve personnel in support of military operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. During his career, General Sherrard commanded an airlift group, two Air Force Reserve installations, two wings, and two Numbered Air Forces.

Donald L. Stockton

Commissioner Stockton owns and for more than 34 years has operated the Marshfield Drayage Company, a regional trucking company in southwest Missouri. He retired as a lieutenant colonel from the U.S. Air Force Reserves, where he served nearly 30 years. For almost 25 years he commanded various flights and squadrons, was deputy commander for resources, and subsequently was deputy commander for support of the 943rd Airlift Wing at March Air Force Base in California. His last command was with the 934th Maintenance Squadron, a subordinate unit of the 934th Airlift Wing, Air Force Reserve, in Minneapolis, where he was responsible for the unit's eight C-130E aircraft and for the training of some 175 reservists. For the Reserve Officers Association of the United States (ROA), he is a past national Air Force vice president, a past Missouri Department president, and currently Chairman of the Department National Council Members.

E. Gordon Stump

Commissioner Stump retired in January 2003 from his position of Adjutant General and the Director of Military and Veterans Affairs in Michigan after serving for 12 years. He commanded and directed a total of 157 Army and Air National Guard units, two veterans nursing homes, and 12 veterans service organizations. His prior assignments included Squadron Commander 107th TFS and Commander and Deputy Commander of the Headquarters Michigan Air National Guard. He flew 241 combat missions over North and South Vietnam. He also deployed to South Korea during the *Pueblo* crisis. He served as President of the National Guard Association of the United States and as a member of the Reserve Forces Policy Board. Prior to his assignment as Adjutant General, he was Vice President of Automotive Engineering for Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. He is currently President of Strategic Defense Associates, LLC.

J. Stanton Thompson

Commissioner Thompson is currently a County Executive Director for the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Farm Service Agency. He is a retired Navy rear admiral with more than 35 years of military service. He is the former Special Assistant for Reserve Matters to the Commander, U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command. He also served as a principal advisor to the commander for maritime homeland defense. Rear Admiral Thompson was one of a handful of flag and general officers chosen to stand up NORTHCOM following the events of 9/11. Recalled to active duty during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, he served as the Port Security Harbor Defense Commander of the Saudi Arabian port of Al Jubail and was responsible for the maritime defense of this strategic port.




Figure VI.1. Current Reserve Component Categories




Figure VI.2. A Continuum of Service Structure for the Active and Reserve Components




Figure VI.3. Proposed Reserve Component Categories